The exact documentation package will depend on the device, its architecture, intended use, connectivity, risk profile, and regulatory pathway. But MedTech teams should generally expect to create and maintain several categories of cybersecurity documents and records, including:
- Threat model
- Cybersecurity risk assessment
- Software bill of materials (SBOM) (statutory requirement under Section 524B for cyber devices)
- Analysis of third-party components
- Cybersecurity management plan
- Postmarket cybersecurity plan
- Vulnerability assessment and penetration testing outputs
- Static application security testing outputs, when applicable
- Documentation of unresolved anomalies
- Cybersecurity labeling or user-facing security information
- Patch, update, and vulnerability response processes
For teams preparing a premarket submission, FDA’s eSTAR v7.0 template includes a dedicated cybersecurity section that maps directly to these document categories. Knowing which template fields correspond to which artifacts helps teams build their documentation package with submission structure in mind from the start.
The important point is not simply that these documents exist. It is that they connect.
The threat model should inform the risk assessment. The SBOM should support third-party component analysis. Testing outputs should feed into risk evaluation. Vulnerability findings should trigger triage, assessment, and, when needed, change control. Postmarket monitoring should connect back to risk management, complaint handling, CAPA, and design changes.
Threat models, risk assessments, and SBOMs are especially common sources of problems. One reason is that teams sometimes apply a traditional IT cybersecurity risk methodology to a medical device context.
In a traditional IT environment, cybersecurity risk may be framed around data protection and likelihood. For medical devices, the assessment must be grounded in patient safety and exploitability.
A related pitfall is applying CVSS scores the same way an IT security team would. A vulnerability rated low or medium severity by CVSS may be critical in a medical device context if it affects a life-sustaining function, a safety-critical alarm, or a diagnostic output. Risk severity in this domain has to account for clinical impact, not just technical exploitability.
A vulnerability is not just a technical issue. The manufacturer has to understand whether it could affect the patient, the device function, the data used to treat the patient, or the information used to make a diagnostic or therapeutic decision.
That distinction changes the way risk needs to be documented and controlled.